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S.ALEs-UNIFoRM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT-STRICT REQUIREMENT OF Ac-
CURACY IN DESIGNATING TRUSTEE IN FILING UNDER THE ACT-Plaintiff and 
E. R. Millen Co., Inc., entered into a financing arrangement whereby plaintiff 
agreed to finance the wholesale purchase of various types of electrical appliances 
by E. R. Millen Co., Inc. Plaintiff promptly recorded a statement of trust 
receipt financing setting forth that the plaintiff "is or expects to be engaged 
in financing under trust receipt transactions the acquisitions by the trustee, 
E. R. Millen Company." The statement then designated the trustee's business 
address. This trust receipts arrangement was in operation for about a year 
when E. R. Millen Co., Inc., made a general assignment of all of its property 
to the defendant for the benefit of its creditors. Plaintiff brought suit to obtain 
a declaratory decree as to its security interest in the electrical equipment turned 
over to defendant. The trial court ruled that the statement filed by the plaintiff 
did not comply with the recording provisions of the Uniform Trust Receipts 
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Act because the trustee's name was given as "E. R. Millen Company,'' instead 
of "E. R. Millen Co., Inc." Consequently, the plaintiff's security interest was 
void as against the defendant.1 On appeal, held, affirmed. As a uniform law, 
the Trust Receipts Act should be strictly construed if the decisions in the several 
states are to be uniform, and exact compliance with the recording provisions 
is accordingly required in order to impart constructive notice to third parties.2 
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Haley, (Mass. 1952) 109 N. E. (2d) 143. 
The principal case is believed to be the first that has dealt with the question 
of the degree of accuracy needed in designating the trustee's name in order to 
comply with the recording requirements of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. 
However, a somewhat analogous problem has frequently been presented by 
cases involving the adequacy of the description of personal property in the 
recordations of conditional sale contracts and chattel mortgages.3 In general, 
the decisions in these cases reflect a less stringent attitude with respect to the 
need for accuracy and completeness than is represented by the decision 
in the principal case. While many cases ·can be found where a description 
has been held defective because it is either inaccurate4 or incomplete, 5 there 
are also numerous cases which have upheld descriptions that are inaccurate in 
some respect6 or are to a considerable extent incomplete.7 For the most part 
1 The critical statutory provisions read as follows: "If the entruster within the period 
of thirty days specified in subsection 1 of section eight files as in this chapter provided, such 
filing shall be effective to preserve his security interest in documents or goods against all 
persons, save as otherwise provided by sections eight to eleven, inclusive, fourteen and 
fifteen." Mass. Laws Ann. (1952 Supp.) c. 255A, §7. "Any entruster undertaking or 
contemplating trust receipt transactions with reference to documents of goods • • • may file 
with the state secretary a statement, signed by the entruster and the trustee, containing: 
(a) A designation of the entruster and the trustee, and of the chief place of business of 
each .••• " Mass. Laws Ann. (1952 Supp.) c. 255A, §13. _ 
2 With the adoption of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act by Michigan in 1952, Mich. 
Comp. Laws (Mason, 1952 Supp.) §§555.401 to 555.419, the act is now in force in 
twenty-eight states. The other states that have adopted the act are Alabama, Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, lliinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wyoming. 
3 Cases collected in 65 A.L.R. 714 (1930). A related problem is also presented where 
the applicable statute requires the inclusion of all conditions or terms of the conditional 
sale contract in the recording instrument. Some of the cases indicate that the statute will 
be strictly construed and applied with respect to questions of accuracy and completeness. 
See Standard Acceptance Corp. v. Connor, 127 Conn. 199, 15 A. (2d) 314 (1940); 
Rhode Island Hospital National Bank v. Larson, 137 Conn. 541, 79 A. (2d) 182 (1951); 
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Thomas, (2d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 892. 
4 Shearer v. Rousch, 32 Ga. App. 663, 124 S.E. 356 (1924); Trapani v. Universal 
Credit Co., 151 Kan. 715, 100 P. (2d) 735 (1940). 
5 A. Y. McDonald Mfg. Co. v. Read, 210 Minn. 232, 297 N.W. 739 (1941); Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 153 Kan. 414, 110 P. (2d) 779 (1941); 
Empire State Chair Co. v. Beldock, (2d Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 587. 
6 G. A. Crancer Co. v. Cooper, 98 Neb. 153, 152 N.W. 304 (1914); MacCallum-
Donahoe Finance Co. v. Warren, 122 Wash. 176, 210 P. 368 (1922); Huber v. Cloud, 
102 N.J. 181, 130 A. 562 (1925); C.I.T. Corp. v. DeGraff Lumber Co., 194 Minn. 169, 
259 N.W. 807 (1935). 
7 Gould v. Huff, 130 Me. 226, 154 A. 574 (1931); In re Central Park Dairyland, 
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these cases are reconcilable and taken together support the frequently stated 
proposition that a description is satisfactory if it will enable a third person to 
identify the property from an inspection of the public records and such reason-
able inquiry as the recording instrument itself suggests.8 It has been said that 
the reason for this rule rests in the frequently inherent difficulty of adequately-
describing personal property.9 If this explanation is correct, it is not surprising 
that a more stringent rule should prevail in the trust receipts situation. There 
could hardly be any unusual difficulty in accurately and adequately designating 
the name of the trustee. However, the fact that the reason for the lenient rule 
in the chattel mortgage and conditional sale cases is not applicable to the trust 
receipts case does not necessitate the adoption of a rule that one hundred 
percent accuracy should be required in the latter situation. Undoubtedly the 
decision in the principal case was prompted in part by the difficulty of form-
ulating a clear and meaningful standard for separating inaccuracies which would 
actually be insignificant from those that might reasonably mislead third parties. 
By the position taken in the principal case, the Massachusetts court has estab-
lished a rule which achieves a high degree of certainty in application. Uni-
formity of decision in the several states is, of course, aided by a fixed and certain 
rule. However, the question remains whether the court in the principal case 
did not pay too high a price in terms of a common sense result for the certainty 
which the decision achieves.10 In any event, the decision sounds a sharp 
warning with respect to the care that should be taken in filing under the Trust 
Receipts Act.11 
John W. Hupp, S.Ed. 
37 N.Y.S. (2d) 270 (1942); Genger v. Albers, 90 Cal. App. (2d) 52, 202 P. (2d) 569 
(1949). 
s G. A. Crancer Co. v. Cooper, note 6 supra; Gould v. Huff, note 7 supra; A. Y. 
McDonald Mfg. Co. v. Read, note 5 supra; International Harvester Co. v. Champlin 
Refining Co., note 5 supra. 
9 65 A.L.R. 714 at 718 (1930); In re Brownsville Brewing Co., (3d Cir. 1941) 117 
F. (2d) 463 at 466. 
10 The following comment has been made in answer to the contention that the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act should be subjected to a highly technical construction: "While, 
of course, as appellee contends, the statute must be strictly construed, it must also be con-
strued with common sense." York Ice Machinery Corp. v. Kearney, 344 Pa. 659 at 662, 
25 A. (2d) 179 (1942). 
11 For a general discussion of the problem of recording under the Trust Receipts Act, 
see Carter, ''The Trust Receipt and the Problem of Recordation or Notice Filing," 1951 
WAsH. Umv. L.Q. 30 (1951). 
